




Secret	
	25 X 1



Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert

25X1

August 1986

ADURESS

001/150/0010/0079996

FILE COPY/SOURCED COPY CUNTROL BRANCH/CPAS/PDG/IMC ROOM 7GO7 HQS NO ADHOC REQUIREMENTS 1 456 466

Secret

DI WAMPA 86-002 August 1986

**Copy 466





Secret	

25X1	

Worldwide Active Measures	
and Propaganda Alert	

25X1

August 1986

This quarterly was prepared by and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

25X1 25X1

Secret
DI WAMPA 86-002
August 1986

- Sanitized Copy Approved	for Release 2012/02/29	: CIA-RDP87T00685R00	00300420003-8

	Secret
	Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert
	August 1986
iii	Preface
1	Perspective: The Next Summit: Propaganda and Active Measures Prospects
	As the national leaders maneuver for another US-Soviet summit meeting, we are sure of one thing: the Soviets already have a campaign in motion to rally support for Soviet initiatives. Prior to the November 1985 summit in Geneva, Moscow and its supporters applied virtually the full range of active measures and propagandar ploys against the United States. For the anticipated next summit, we expect to see more of the same tactics, probably with more style and sophistication—in keeping with General Secretary Gorbachev's increased emphasis on propaganda and imaginally increased.
5	Worldwide Campaigns
	Gorbachev's Arms Control Offensive
	International Year of Peace Update: The World Congress in Copenhagen
	Moscow's Agenda for the 41st UN General Assembly
	Pushing Hard on the Labor Front
	Neoglobalism: New Soviet Propaganda on the United States and the Third
	World
14	Regional Activities
	Western Europe: Soviet Preoccupation with Arms Control
	Soviet Opportunism in Africa
	Latin America Remains a Key Communist Target
	Soviet Political Influence in the Middle East: A Mixed Scorecard
	South Asia: Manipulation in India, Pressure in Pakistan, Deception in Afghanistan, and Money in Bangladesh
	East Asia and the Pacific: Targeting ASEAN
	Libya: Retrenching in the Caribbean

Secret DI WAMPA 86-002 August 1986

i

الماسية بالشباب بالمسالمة فالماريها م

Secret

ii

Secret	
	25 X 1
	20/(1

25X1

-	4		
ν	rαi	· a	~
	101	a	

This quarterly publication provides timely updates of continuing active measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies, covering the period 15 May to 15 August. It also provides warning of future campaigns. It is organized into four parts:

- A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
- Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
- Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the arena of political influence—active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy—and speculation on future developments.
- A calendar of events over the next year that will probably figure prominently in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies.

iii

Secret
DI WAMPA 86-002
August 1986

	Secret
	Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert
	August 1986
Perspective	The Next Summit: Propaganda and Active Measures Prospects
	As the national leaders maneuver for another US-Soviet summit meeting, we are sure of one thing: the Soviets already have a campaign in motion to rally support for Soviet initiatives. Prior to the November 1985 summit in Geneva, the Soviets and their supporters applied virtually the full range of active measures and propaganda ploys against the United States, including diplomatic pressure, disinformation, contradictory signals, front group declarations, and overt press propaganda. For the anticipated next summit, we expect to see more of the same tactics, probably with more style and sophistication—in keeping with General Secretary Gorbachev's increased emphasis on propaganda and image building.
	With the venue of the summit set for Washington, the Soviets undoubtedly will be mounting a massive propaganda effort against the American public. a public relations film on Gorbachev is being prepared for showing to US audiences this fall. We expect to see a steady flow of Soviet visitors—diplomats, academicians, business officials, scientists, and other professionals—who will be tasked with alerting US contacts to special Soviet concerns regarding the meeting. Last year these envoys conveyed the following signals: Moscow needed an arms control agreement in order to ease the strain on the Soviet economy; Gorbachev needed some summit success to counter opposition at home;
	and new US-Soviet commercial opportunities were likely if the meeting was successful. While similar arguments are likely to resurface this year, the Soviets may have initiated what appears to be a new theme—that the United States is under pressure to deal with Moscow.
	West European audiences will be accorded a high priority as well. Soviet spokesmen will continue to tour European capitals as part of a continuing campaign to convince US allies that Moscow is attentive to West European security interests. The Soviets will press their hosts to influence the United States on the merits of Moscow's initiatives and will seek maximum media exposure to present their case. To help convince West European and Third World audiences of its interest in arms control, Moscow will continue to seek support among the

Secret
DI WAMPA 86-002
August 1986

25**X**1

1

comprehensive test ban.

In the weeks preceding last year's meeting in Geneva, harsh criticism of US positions on arms control, SDI, and human rights appeared daily in the Soviet press. With the exception of the President, Soviet media also routinely attacked US administration officials. We anticipate similar efforts as the summit date nears. On the basis of recent Soviet propaganda themes, we also expect presummit criticism of the United States for alleged state terrorism and neoglobalist designs on the Third World.

Last year Soviet-controlled front groups staged a series of activities in support of Soviet positions. During October 1985, for example, Gorbachev pushed standard Soviet "peace" propaganda at a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Last year Soviet-controlled front groups staged a series of activities in support of Soviet positions. During October 1985, for example, Gorbachev pushed standard Soviet "peace" propaganda at a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Moscow, and the Australian affiliate of the World Peace Council hosted an international conference that attacked SDI and alleged US development of a nuclear first-strike capability. For the next summit, we expect the usual grouping of Soviet supporters—for example, the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Scientific Workers—to exploit events relating to the UN International Year of Peace as a means of pushing Soviet summit initiatives. In addition, Moscow probably will encourage organizations such as the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War to hold meetings or demonstrations as the summit takes place. Within the United States, Soviet-affiliated front groups, led by the Communist Party of the USA, will again attempt to influence peace, political, and religious organizations to pressure the administration. Moscow will also promote its position among various US-Soviet groups, such as the Forum for US-Soviet Dialogue, which met in Colorado in May to discuss SDI.

For the 1985 summit, Moscow played on the human rights theme by manipulating the Yelena Bonner and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy cases and the reunification-of-families issue to demonstrate the Soviet regime's willingness to cooperate. While we cannot rule out similar tactics for the next summit, we believe—on the basis of its recent gestures—that Moscow is more likely to focus on countering Western allegations of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union by charging, for example, US support to racist South Africa.

Notably absent from Moscow's 1985 campaign was evidence of Soviet use of so-called dirty tricks—for example, forgeries, whisper campaigns against President Reagan, and the organization of violent demonstrations. We have no indications of such activities being prepared for the next summit and doubt the USSR would risk jeopardizing any chances for a successful outcome by employing them this year.

In our view, the most significant difference in Moscow's approach to the forthcoming summit compared to the previous one is likely to be the role of Gorbachev. While he was active in the 1985 campaign—culminating in his four-day visit to Paris just prior to the summit—we believe that he will be even more visible this year as the meeting approaches. Gorbachev's highly successful Western-style campaigning during the past year before the press and on television has no doubt bolstered his confidence in his ability to manipulate summit issues to

Soviet advantage. In addition, his recent invitation to British Prime Minister Thatcher to visit Moscow this fall suggests that he will continue to use every available opportunity to personally present his proposals to Western audiences.	
	25 X 1
In the event that the meeting is canceled—for whatever reason—the Soviets are already laying the groundwork to place the blame firmly on the United States, most likely through a major propaganda campaign pointing to US intransigence in arms talks or US failure to guarantee concrete achievements ahead of time. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Loginov stated in a mid-July radio interview in Belgrade, for example, that a second summit is contingent on "tangible results" at the Geneva arms negotiations and attributed the current stalemate to Washington.	
	25 X 1
	25X1



Worldwide Campaigns	25 X 1
Gorbachev's Arms Control Offensive General Secretary Gorbachev continues to take the lead in pushing Moscow's arms control agenda. In addition to launching a string of arms control initiatives since the beginning of the year, his speeches on arms control have set the tone for harsh Soviet criticism of US policies. While Western Europe remains the USSR's top priority, Moscow also targets the US public and is using arms control propaganda in the Third World to fan anti-US sentiment there. During the past few months, the Soviets have continued to campaign actively against the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and Western development and deployment of binary chemical weapons and in favor of their own proposals.	25X1 25X1
Moscow recently intensified its efforts to influence West European policymakers through a flurry of diplomatic visits described by British and Dutch officials as a Soviet "charm offensive" on arms control, according to US Embassy and press reporting. In July alone, French President Mitterrand and West German Foreign Minister Genscher traveled to Moscow, while Colonel-General Chervov of the Soviet General Staff and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze were in London; Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovski visited The Hague; chief Soviet arms negotiator Karpov held talks in Bonn; and CPSU Central Committee member Kornienko briefed Greek Prime Minister Papandreou in Athens. In virtually every case, the Soviets pushed their own initiatives, blamed the lack of progress at the negotiating table on the United States, and lobbied the Europeans to try to influence US policies.	25 X 1
In addition to exploiting diplomatic venues, Moscow is employing a number of other techniques in its bid to influence the full spectrum of arms control issues: The USSR continues to make heavy use of international conferences—many of which are staged by Soviet front organizations—as forums to attack US arms control policies. At the May meeting of the Soviet-controlled Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in Moscow, for example, a message read on behalf of Gorbachev accused the United States of efforts to create new superweapons within the framework of SDI. In mid-July, Gorbachev met in Moscow with a group of scientists—participating there in an international scientific forum for a nuclear test ban—to commend their efforts and inform them that Moscow's decision regarding the extension of its unilateral moratorium would depend largely on US policy.	

5

• In what may signal a worldwide effort, the Soviets—according to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires—held a rare press conference there in late June at which Soviet spokesmen tried to drum up opposition to the US position on

Secret

SALT II.



Arms control propaganda of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council.

25X1

- Largely through paid newspaper advertisements, Gorbachev's 15 January
 proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 received widespread
 coverage in Africa with the message that Western arms expenditures divert
 much-needed economic aid from the Third World.
- Moscow has continued its worldwide disinformation campaign alleging that AIDS was developed jointly by the Pentagon and the CIA in the course of biological warfare experiments conducted during the 1950s and 1960s. Although the original intent of the campaign was probably to blame the United States for the appearance of AIDS in the Bloc countries, we suspect that the story now is being used to create fear of the US military abroad and of the forthcoming deployment of new chemical weapons outside the United States.
- The Soviet press regularly publishes a litany of overt propaganda on arms control issues. Pravda, for example, characterized the 11 June Budapest proposal on conventional weapons as "an appeal to all NATO member states and to all European countries" in light of the "imperial, globalist ambitions of [the] US administration."

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

In the coming months, while we anticipate that Moscow will continue to explore new means of marketing its existing—as well as any forthcoming— arms control proposals, we believe that public diplomacy and propaganda will continue to be the primary vehicles in this campaign. Already the Soviets have indicated that they will publicly attack SDI at the 41st UN General Assembly, which opens in mid-September. (See Moscow's Agenda for the 41st UN General Assembly for details.) Other targets of future Soviet propaganda in the arms control arena are certain to include the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference to be held in Geneva in September and the November Conference on Security and Cooperation in Western Europe (CSCE) Review Conference in Vienna. (See calendar for details.)

International Year of Peace Update: The World Congress in Copenhagen

The Bella Conference Center in Copenhagen, site of the October 1986 World Congress for the UN International Year of Peace.



	taken measures	designed to cot	inter these
developments.			

We believe that these efforts to salvage the reputation of the Congress, heralded in East bloc press as the "culmination of the UN's IYP," will not be successful, and that the meeting will be attended only by WPC-affiliated front organizations and peace groups sympathetic to Soviet disarmament policies. Though the Soviets will try to put the best face possible on the meeting in their own press coverage, the Danish press will continue—and perhaps intensify—its negative coverage of the Congress and be prepared to publicize any anti-Soviet activities that take place, such as protests outside the conference center by independent East European peace groups over human rights abuses in the Soviet Union.

Secret 8

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1

Moscow's Agenda for the 41st UN General Assembly Following past practice, Soviet strategy for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) opening in mid-September will be to exploit the UN forum to propagandize Moscow's proposals on arms control, regional security issues, and the UN financial	25 X 1
crisis.	25 X 1
The Soviets almost certainly will give priority to winning endorsement by the United Nations for General Secretary Gorbachev's string of arms control initiatives. Probably with this endorsement in mind, Moscow originally shaped some of these proposals to fit the UN political context. For example, the 15 January proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 first appeared in public correspondence from Gorbachev to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. Similarly, the Soviets first presented their plan for a multilateral test ban treaty to the UN Committee on Disarmament.	25 X 1
A letter from Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov to Perez de Cuellar reviving Moscow's "star peace" proposal indicates that the Soviets will publicly attack the US SDI program at the UNGA session. By incorporating features designed to appeal to the Third World—such as the creation of a World Space Organization dedicated to the development of agriculture, improvement of communications, and establishment of a global weather forecasting service—the Soviets probably hope to overcome the apathy toward last year's "star peace" proposal.	25X1
The Soviets can be expected to press their proposal for an early international agreement to ban and destroy chemical weapons stockpiles. We believe this proposal is intended to counter the NATO decision to site binary chemical weapons in West Germany. Moscow's strategy on this issue probably will be to divert attention from US verification proposals, which it opposes, and take advantage of an opportunity to fuel West European anxieties over the forthcoming deployment of these weapons.	25 X 1
In a move to capitalize on lingering anti-US sentiment resulting from the US airstrikes against Libya last spring, the Soviets probably will lobby for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's proposal to establish a "peace and security" zone in the Mediterranean area. In a recent letter to Perez de Cuellar, Shevardnadze implied that the scheme entails withdrawal of both the US 6th Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. The proposal is worded as an appeal to the nonaligned for support of measures to protect national liberation movements, such as the PLO and the Polisario Front, and not simply Libya.	25 X 1
Past practice suggests that Moscow will follow the African lead on southern African issues that will emerge from the Nonaligned Summit meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, which ends on 7 September. The Soviets will certainly continue to support economic sanctions against South Africa and encourage the UNGA to adopt name-calling resolutions associating the United States with the Pretoria	
regime.	25 X 1

9

We expect the Soviets to continue pushing their	"save the UN" propaganda
campaign. For example, the World Peace Counc	cil, at the request of UNESCO
Director General M'Bow, is organizing a meetin	ng of people from cultural,
educational, and scientific fields to counter West	tern charges of bias and incompe-
tence in UNESCO	Moscow will also probably play
up their own hard currency contribution to the U	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) as a contrast to the US decision to cu	t back UN funding. Finally, we
anticipate that they will publicize the US-ordere	ed personnel reduction at the
Soviet Mission in New York—scheduled for 1 O	october—as an alleged violation of
the UN headquarters agreement.	

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

While it is difficult to project what success Moscow will achieve at the UNGA, we expect some nonaligned member states to endorse Gorbachev's arms control initiatives; the Foreign Ministers of the Nonaligned Movement supported them at their meeting in New Delhi last spring. The Soviets also may find some backing for Shevardnadze's plan for the Mediterranean because it is likely to appeal to at least a few liberation movements in the Middle East and Africa. In contrast, because Third World representatives to the UN generally view the "star peace" initiative as a propaganda ploy, we believe Moscow will gain little, if any, additional support for it.

Pushing Hard on the Labor Front

Moscow has been pushing hard during the past few months to increase its penetration of labor unions through a variety of channels, namely the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU)—WFTU's parent organization—and pro-Soviet Communist unionists. While the long-term objective of this effort is to build Soviet influence around the world—often at US expense—the Soviets are also trying to drum up support for WFTU's 11th World Trade Union Congress to be held in East Berlin during 16-22 September. Moscow has been particularly active recently in the South Pacific, the Middle East, and Latin America:

- US Embassy reporting indicates that the pro-Soviet Pacific Trade Union Community (PTUC) backed New Zealand's call for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone at its May conference in Auckland. In our view, a major force behind the PTUC endorsement was Jim Knox, the head of New Zealand's leftist Federation of Labor (FOL) and chairman of a regional WFTU affiliate. WFTU's growing influence over the FOL itself is demonstrated by the fact that the Federation is planning to send 12 delegates to the forthcoming WFTU Congress, a threefold increase over its representation at the 10th World Congress in Havana in 1982, according to the US Embassy in Wellington.
- Trade union delegations from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union visited Egypt in June for the first time in 10 and 12 years, respectively. According to the US Embassy in Cairo, the Czechoslovaks and Soviets initiated the visits and pressured the Egyptian General Trade Union Federation (EGTUF) to resume direct union-to-union contacts. WFTU also has been pushing EGTUF—which accepted an invitation to East Berlin—to revive long-moribund ties.

WFTU—working through a Mexican labor university—will partially fund instruction expenses at the Ecuadorean Workers' Confederation (CTE) union school, which will be established in the near future. In the meantime, AUCCTU will provide the WFTU-affiliated CTE with scholarships for labor courses in the Soviet Union. AUCCTU also requested the CTE—headed by a Central Committee member of the Communist Party of Ecuador—to draft a report on Ecuador's labor movement, paying particular attention to unionists that the Soviets should work with and support.	25X1
In contrast to these favorable developments, Moscow and its allies are having difficulty coaxing some non-WFTU affiliated unions to attend the East Berlin Congress, even though they are touting it as being open to all trade unions regardless of ideology and are lavishly offering full-expenses paid invitations to some independent unions:	25X1
• According to the US Embassy in Bonn, the Soviets and East Europeans have been trying doggedly—so far to no avail—to arrange an East-West meeting with the West German Trade Union Federation (DGB). Most recently, the senior Soviet in WFTU called a DGB official to confirm the group's attendance at the Congress, but was told that no DGB representatives would participate.	
	25X1
These setbacks are the latest in a series of problems encountered recently by WFTU. the CTE leader complained to Moscow in May that WFTU is excessively bureaucratic, and that in Latin America it neither actively supports union aspirations nor addresses the problems confronting labor movements there. The Hungarians made similar complaints at their trade union congress in February and called for the organization's renewal. Even WFTU publications have been urging a more active policy. The Draft Main Document of the 11th Congress, for example, cites as WFTU's main tasks the unification of trade unions regardless of ideology or affiliation and the formulation of policy that effectively treats the concerns of workers. It also proposes, among other things, that WFTU engage in more diversified regional activities and develop a more intensive training program for cadres.	25X1
In response to these problems, Moscow may try to revitalize WFTU at the forthcoming Congress, perhaps by shaking up the organization's leadership or reorganizing its bureaucratic structure. In any event, we expect the meeting to pass a number of resolutions on economic issues tailored to WFTU's Third World clientele. These include a moratorium on or abolition of Third World debt payments; union participation in the formulation and implementation of development strategies; and a statement on union rights—especially the right to strike and	25X1

11

the right of unions to be consulted on economic and social policy. Moreover, Moscow will undoubtedly use the event as a major propaganda forum to publicize the standard Soviet line on key issues such as disarmament, SDI, and apartheid.

25X1

Neoglobalism: New Soviet Propaganda on the United States and the Third World

25X1

Over the past several months, Soviet journalists, international affairs specialists, and even General Secretary Gorbachev have used the term "neoglobalism" as part of a worldwide propaganda campaign to describe what they assert is a new American doctrine and philosophy for the Third World. According to Soviet commentators, the basis of neoglobalism is the renewed US insistence on defining the entire world as its sphere of interest. To promote its "imperialist" interests in the global arena, the Reagan administration is said to be ready to prolong existing regional conflicts that threaten "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" governments,

Soviet cartoon entitled
"Dreams of a Neoglobalist and
Possible Consequences."

Мечты неоглобалиста и возможные последствия

25X1




Рис. И. ОФФЕНГЕНДЕНА


such as Angola and Afghanistan, and initiate new ones with countries that do not suit US preferences, such as Libya and Syria. These activities are "justified" by Washington in terms of supporting democracy, antiterrorism, and anti-Communism.	25X1
 Soviet propagandists depict the United States as ready to use a wide variety of instruments in pursuit of its neoglobalist objectives, including: Economic leverage that exploits Third World underdevelopment and debt to increase dependency on the West. Political pressure intended to remove rightwing dictators who have become counterproductive to US purposes in favor of more respectable but still pliable leaders who may be able to deflect pressure for revolutionary change. Covert and overt military assistance for "bandits, terrorists, and counterrevolutionaries." Direct US military intervention with Rapid Deployment Forces, "light divi- 	
sions," and other power projection forces.	25 X 1
Neoglobalism has served Moscow as a vehicle for integrating several propaganda lines it has used over the past year to try to discredit US policy in the international arena, notably accusations that Washington promotes "state terrorism" and exports counterrevolution. Gorbachev's speech during Algerian President Benjedid's March visit to Moscow—in which he tied together Soviet criticism of US policy in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Grenada—is one example of how neoglobalism is used in this context. Also, recent Soviet press coverage of US actions toward Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Libya has prominently featured neoglobalism as an explanation of alleged US aggression	
against these states.	25 X 1
The timing of neoglobalism's advent as a propaganda theme is probably in part a counter to the US emphasis on regional issues before and during last year's Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. Moscow has used the theme to castigate the supposed insincerity of US proposals on Third World issues, portraying Washington's underlying policy as one of interference and aggression. Moreover, one Soviet commentator used the concept to criticize the United States specifically for elevating Third World issues to the same level of importance as arms control on the US-Soviet agenda, and for claiming that there should be linkage between progress in these areas.	25 X 1
Neoglobalism will probably continue to be a central theme of Soviet international propaganda in coming months. Soviet comments, both on US policy toward particular countries or regions and on US foreign policy in general, will play up US neoglobalist intentions and the threat they allegedly pose to Third World stability and progress in East-West relations. This message will be aimed not only at Third World audiences but also those in Western Europe and the United States where Moscow will try to use the theme to influence Western debates on aiding anti-Soviet insurgents and on the relative priority of regional versus arms control issues. In addition, Moscow probably will continue to put forward regional proposals of its own from time to time to polish its image and influence Western deliberations on Third World questions, contrasting its initiatives with alleged US	
neoglobalist behavior.	25X1

Regional Activities	25 X 1
Western Europe: Soviet Preoccupation With Arms Control Arms control issues have dominated Soviet influence activities recently in Western Europe. While ruling government officials remain the key target of Moscow's campaign on arms control (see "Gorbachev's Arms Control Offensive"), the USSR	25 X 1
has also actively courted West European opposition political parties such as the West German Social Democrats (SPD) and the British Labor Party. this strategy is meeting with some success. Following an April visit to Moscow, an SPD member of the West German arms control disarmament subcommittee reported that the Soviets made a convincing case for taking seriously General Secretary Gorbachev's 15 January proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000, according to the US Embassy in Bonn. British Labor Party Shadow Foreign Secretary Dennis Healy returned from a June trip to	25X1 25X1
Moscow optimistic about Soviet intentions on nuclear disarmament, on the basis of an article he authored in the British press.	25X1
	25X1
The USSR's efforts to exploit the arms control debate in Western Europe have been hindered, however, by lingering concerns there over Soviet handling of the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster, even among committed supporters. the pro-Soviet West Berlin Communist Party (SEW) held a meeting in early June to discuss ways of overcoming problems caused by the accident to the party's campaign supporting Soviet disarmament policies. Some SEW members chided the party's adherence to the Soviet propaganda line on Chernobyl' and requested a more honest discussion of its implications for the Berlin area.	25X1 25X1 25X1
	25X1

Nevertheless, given the growing body of evidence that the USSR is now planning for another US-Soviet summit meeting—at which disarmament issues would be high on the agenda—we believe Moscow will be intensifying its arms control push in Western Europe in the weeks ahead. Already Gorbachev has invited British Prime Minister Thatcher to Moscow, and, according to the US Embassy in Helsinki, Finnish Foreign Minister Vayrynen is scheduled to lead a delegation there this fall. The Soviets would undoubtedly use such occasions to stress their sincerity in seeking arms reductions and to continue their concerted lobbying of European leaders to press Washington for progress in	25X1
negotiations.	25X1
Soviet Opportunism in Africa Although Moscow's major African priority is to take advantage of events in southern Africa (see "Moscow's Gambit in Southern Africa: Exploiting Apartheid"), the past few months have witnessed a variety of Soviet maneuvers elsewhere in Africa. Chief among them are apparent Soviet attempts to exploit suspicions among some senior African leaders about the viability of their regimes, continuing measures to expand Moscow's longstanding scholarship program in the region, and the surfacing of its worldwide disinformation campaign on AIDS	25X1 25X1
In Zaire, the Soviets have apparently used press reports that Zaire serves as a transit point for US military aid to UNITA forces to help endear themselves to President Mobutu. A few days after Zambian President Kaunda criticized Mobutu on this issue in late April, Moscow lent credibility to Mobutu's denial in an <i>Izvestiya</i> article claiming that these charges were part of a US-South African disinformation conspiracy; this allegation received extensive coverage in Zairian newspapers and radio. In addition, the Soviet Ambassador has stepped up activities in Kinshasa to improve bilateral relations	25X1
	25 X 1
In the Seychelles, we believe that Moscow could have played a role in President Rene's claim of a plot by the British MI6, French DGSE, and the CIA to overthrow his government. While the list of possible candidates for initiating such claims is extensive—including some of Rene's leftist advisers, Seychelles exiles, and Libya—past Soviet involvement in spreading disinformation about coup plotting in the Seychelles suggests that a Soviet role cannot be ruled out.	05.74
Th:	25 X 1
This most recent allegation—only a few days before the ninth anniversary of the coup d'etat that brought Rene to power—and its impact on Seychelles' relations with the West—Rene postponed the visit of a senior US military official and canceled upcoming ship visits by the US and British Navies—suggests that a foreign government	
hostile to the West could have been responsible.	25 X 1

15

Patrice Lumumba University, Moscow's training center for Third World students.



Elsewhere, Moscow has been using offers of scholarships in a continuation of its long-term effort to build up a cadre of Africans sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

the USSR recently made scholarships

available to students in Somalia in a move to improve relations there.

over the past several months the Soviets have also offered scholarships in technical fields to students in Guinea and increased their offers in Uganda. These moves follow Moscow's acceptance earlier this year of a request by the Sudanese Communist Party to provide scholarships for Sudanese to study in the Soviet Union,

The Soviet disinformation campaign charging that the US Government is spreading AIDS—begun last fall in Moscow—finally surfaced in Africa with a flurry of press accusations during June and July in Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal. We believe that the African phase of the campaign was delayed for two reasons. First, unlike other areas of the world, there is not a large US presence in Africa—either military or civilian—on which the Soviets can place blame for the disease. In addition, because little diagnostic testing has been completed and nation-by-nation AIDS statistics appeared only recently, the African public was neither aware of nor alarmed about the dangers of AIDS.

In the near term, we expect the Soviets to follow up on the themes they have used this summer in Africa to try to discredit US policies. In the Seychelles, we believe they will step up anti-US propaganda in an effort to exploit Rene's coup fears and sustain his suspicion of the West. In Zaire, Moscow will continue to offer limited

Secret

25X1

25X1 25X1

25**X**1

25**X**1

25X1

25**X**1

16

economic, cultural, and possibly military incentives in hopes of getting Mobutu to adopt a more neutral, less pro-West position and of gaining some support at the United Nations. The Soviets are also likely to encourage Africa's nonaligned leaders to endorse Soviet arms control initiatives as the next US-Soviet summit date nears. On the AIDS front, we expect Moscow to surface more anti-US allegations periodically throughout the continent in an effort to counteract the positive image that the United States is gaining as a result of its successful medical diagnostic support in many countries. 25X1 Latin America Remains a Key Communist Target [25X1 Latin America remains a focus of Communist propaganda and active measures activities. Moscow has stepped up its efforts in the region during the past few months, while Cuba continues to provide covert funding to leftist groups, build leftist political coalitions, and target both religion and the media: • In Chile, the Cubans are continuing their covert financial support of leftist opposition groups. 25X1 25X1 • The Cubans increased their influence operations recently in Ecuador. 25X1 Havana is trying to broaden official contacts through 25X1 diplomatic channels and is supporting a plan to unite Ecuador's political left, including the Communist and Socialist Revolutionary Parties, in hopes of revising Febres-Cordero's policies and of finding an acceptable candidate to run in the 1988 presidential election. 25X1 the Cuban Embassy is working to improve relations with the Ecuadorean 25X1 media—especially the government's National Information Secretariat. • In a move to strengthen the credibility of Cuba's campaign to influence Latin American Christians, Havana has decided to send a small number of lay people to the prestigious University of Louvain in Brussels for advanced study in liberation theology, according to a report from the US Interests section in Havana, A Belgian diplomat indicates that the Cuban students will be the first ever from a Communist nation to be enrolled in the course. The Cubans may have opted not to send clergy—who are subject to the Cuban Catholic Church hierarchy—to ensure greater control over the students upon completion of their

17 Secret


studies.

	25X1
	25X1
• The Soviets staged a rare press conference in Buenos Aires in late June at which Soviet spokesmen—in response to questions from the press—charged that nuclear cargo from British ships sunk during the 1982 Falklands war were contaminating the South Atlantic. The Soviets also linked recent penguin deaths in the Falklands area to the nuclear radioactivity. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires speculated that the questions may have been planted because the Soviets	
were primed to reply.	25 X 1
Future Soviet operations in the Caribbean and Central America may be orchestrated from Cuba instead of Moscow. Already there are indications that the Soviets are setting up their Embassy in Havana as a base for regional activities.	25 X 1
The appointment of	
high-level Soviet personnel to Havana in the future would provide additional evidence of an expanding Soviet presence in the hemisphere.	25X1
Soviet Political Influence in the Middle East: A Mixed Scorecard Our assessment of Soviet political influence activities in the Middle East during the past quarter indicates a mixed scorecard of Soviet successes and failures. Moscow continued to encourage fears of US or Israeli attacks on Muslim countries, and is polishing its image in the Persian Gulf. In contrast, the Soviet-	25X1
controlled World Peace Council (WPC) tried unsuccessfully to organize a meeting of peace groups in the region.	25 X 1

The Soviets effectively exploited the October 1985 Israeli attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis and the April 1986 US airstrikes against Libya as a backdrop for Soviet propaganda and active measures operations warning of impending "imperialist and Zionist aggression":	
	25 X 1
• The Soviet and Syrian press recently revived charges—originally surfaced in Damascus by TASS during a large Israeli military exercise this spring in the Golan Heights—that Tel Aviv was preparing to attack Syria. On 20 July, Syrian papers headlined a Soviet political commentator's remark that "Israel is beginning preparations for an attack against Syria." Two days later <i>Pravda</i> was quoted in Syrian papers as affirming that the Arab-Israeli conflict may lead to "an explosion at any time." For its part, the Syrian press used the theme to assail Vice President Bush's visit earlier this month to the Middle East as an occasion for him to consult with Israel on "direct aggression against Syria."	25 X 1
Moscow now considers Kuwait to be its springboard for Soviet involvement and political influence activities throughout the Persian Gulf, Cautiously using their presence of about 85 officials, the Soviets place articles in Kuwaiti newspapers—which circulate widely in the Gulf—in hopes of creating the impression that the Gulf states have nothing to fear from the USSR. New Soviet Ambassador Arkipov has masterfully used press conferences to gain	25X1 25X1
favorable publicity for Soviet policies. In addition, the Soviets use their diplomatic contacts to cultivate the large Arab expatriate population in Kuwait, including Palestinians, who work both within and outside the Kuwaiti media.	25X1 25X1
On the other hand, the WPC canceled a meeting of its officials and local peace committee representatives from the eastern Mediterranean and Arab countries planned for late September in Nicosia Only Libya and the PLO supported the meeting, while others, such as Jordan, expressed contempt for such WPC "sloganeering" in the Middle East. The large number of groups in the region, the diversity of their interests, and government control over some of the local peace committees have been longstanding obstacles to WPC-	25X1
WPC setbacks notwithstanding, we believe that the Middle East will still offer Moscow numerous propaganda and active measures opportunities in the future. In Kuwait, for example, we expect the Soviets will direct their media assets to play up the political and economic benefits to Kuwait of its recently negotiated \$150 million loan to Moscow and of other Kuwaiti-Soviet business deals estimated at	25X1

19

three-quarters of a billion dollars. Moscow also is likely to propagandize Arab criticism of Moroccan King Hassan's unilaterally initiated meeting in July with	
Israeli Prime Minister Peres by labeling the event as a US-inspired attempt to "draw Arab countries into separate Middle East peace talks."	25X1
South Asia: Manipulation in India, Pressure in Pakistan,	
Deception in Afghanistan, and Money in Bangladesh	25X1
South Asia continues to be the scene of a wide range of Soviet political influence	
campaigns. During the past quarter, the Soviets improved their already impressive manipulation of the Indian press, continued their exploitation of the internal	
political situation in Pakistan, and produced deceptive televised propaganda in	•
Afghanistan to support the new Communist regime there.	25 X 1
	25 X 1
	25 X 1
In a systematic effort to ease their access to the Indian press as well as help fi-	
nance newspaper placements, Soviet officials in New Delhi solicited nearly \$20,000 during June from at least 17 Indian businesses.	05.74
the Soviet Trade Mission enticed the firms to hire the Soviet-controlled ad	25 X 1 25 X 1
agency, Interads, by promising, in return, that Moscow would favorably consider	20/(1
future business deals. At the same time, the Soviet Information Department (SID)	
offered to help certain Indian newspapers and magazines obtain advertising—from	
Interads—if they would agree to publish material provided by SID.	25 X 1
The Soviet and Afghan campaign to infiltrate refugee camps in Pakistan and to	
carry out bombings and assassinations in the border region continued. During the	
first six months of this year, according to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, 108	
people were killed and nearly 400 injured in bombings or mine explosions, most of	
which were carried out by agents of the Afghan intelligence service, KHAD, and	
Afghan-trained Pakistani tribesmen.	0EV4
In	25 X 1
our view, Moscow and the Soviet-run Afghan Government hope to exploit	
Pakistani fears and discontent with the over 2 million Afghan refugees there as	
well as to weaken both Islamabad's close ties to the United States and its ability to	
maintain domestic political support for the Mujahideen insurgents. Recent Soviet	
disinformation efforts have paralleled these subversive activities. In late June, for	
example, a Lahore daily carried a brief item datelined Moscow alleging that the	
Mujahideen were being trained in Pakistan by 1500 American advisers, including 300 CIA agents who were providing instruction in the use of chemical weapons.	
The use of chemical weapons.	25 X 1
	20,(1
These deals include power plant construction projects in Iraq and Morocco, gas pipeline projects in Iraq and Greece, and power and oil projects in the USSR.	25 X 1
	7:1A I



25X1

Meanwhile, Moscow, through its Afghan surrogates, apparently supported the formation in July of the Awami National Party (ANP)—an alliance of leftist parties in Pakistan—in hopes of encouraging both anti-Islamabad and anti-US sentiment there. According to US Embassy reporting, the presence of the Afghan Consul General in Karachi at the ANP's founding meeting prompted a public warning from Islamabad—aimed at Moscow and Kabul—that foreign participation in such meetings violated diplomatic norms and would not be tolerated. In addition, at the ANP's first public rally, party spokesmen condemned US imperialism in Pakistan and claimed that 70 percent of US weapons provided to the Afghan insurgents are diverted to the black market, stimulating a dangerous rise in lawlessness throughout the country.	0EV4
in lawlessness throughout the country.	25X1
In a move to polish the image of newly appointed Afghan Communist Party boss Najibullah, Soviet officials responsible for television in Afghanistan are producing film clips and still photos that demonstrate his close contacts with Afghan religious	
leaders. the Soviets splice friendly crowd scenes from old file footage of former party chief Karmal into current films of Najibullah's speeches. In some cases, lines spoken by Najibullah have been erased	25 X 1
and replaced with ones recited by a Dari-speaking Soviet officer.	25 X 1
	25X1
In the near term, we expect the Soviets and Afghans will continue their destabilization campaign in Pakistan at current levels. We believe that the Soviets will be reluctant to increase their subversive activities substantially unless they decide that the war has reached a critical juncture and that additional pressure on Pakistan would force a rupture between the insurgents and the Pakistani government. In Afghanistan itself, where Moscow is seeking to develop an effective, reliable leader in Najibullah, more Soviet public relations gimmicks—such as high-profile media events—are likely to be forthcoming. The Soviets will also continue longstanding efforts to consolidate their position in India, probably by trying to sell themselves as an attractive alternative to Western economic and technological ties, and by promoting continued distrust between India and Pakistan.	25X1
East Asia and the Pacific: Targeting ASEAN The Soviets for years have had little success with active measures and other political influence techniques in ASEAN member states but remain persistent. During the past several months they have been particularly active in Thailand,	25X1

which held its national election on 27 July, and in the Philippines, where the Aquino government is still consolidating power.	25 X 1
Soviet activities in Thailand are aimed at damaging US-Thai relations and strengthening Soviet influence. In recent months the Soviets have: • Spread rumors that the United States will establish a military base in Thailand if it loses existing bases in the Philippines. The rumors probably have exacerbated existing Thai nervousness on the issue. • Tried to capitalize on US-Thai trade frictions by offering to buy the affected Thai exports. Some politicians, businessmen, and academics have demanded increased trade with the USSR, but this is unlikely given the Soviet preference to barter rather than pay hard currency for imports.	25 X 1
	25X1
• Urged Thai politicians to establish a Thai-Soviet friendship association. Several have tried but their efforts have foundered due to lack of interest and opposition from the government.	25 X 1
In the Philippines, the Soviets have been trying to build a base of influence in the Labor Ministry. the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS), an affiliate of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), has increased its influence under the Aquino government. Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez heavily favors the Kilusang Mayo Uno, a leftist federation, but is also a friend of the head of TUPAS. Sanchez created a labor advisory committee in the ministry and gave the three WFTU-affilated unions equal status with the two much larger labor federations. TUPAS has dominated the committee, and consequently the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), the largest and most moderate federation, has withdrawn.	25X1
Timppines (1001), the largest and most moderate rederation, has well as well as the largest and most moderate rederation, has well as well as the largest and most moderate rederation, has well as the largest and most moderate rederation, has well as the largest and most moderate rederation, has been also as the largest and most moderate rederation.	25X1
Future Soviet efforts in the region may be directed at Indonesia. Zulharman Said, the Chairman of the Association of Indonesian Journalists (PWI), says his organization plans to send journalists from four major dailies and several provincial newspapers to the USSR this year on exchange visits. Zulharman wants to show Western press agencies that Indonesia can turn to socialist countries if the Western press maintains its alleged anti-Indonesian bias, exemplified recently by Australian press articles on the finances of President Suharto's family. We expect the Soviets to wine and dine the journalists in hopes of building influence in the Indonesian press. In our view	25X1 25X1

23

however, this strategy is not likely to result in any significant gains for Moscow.

Although the Indonesian Government allows some favorable press play of the USSR to enhance its nonaligned image, it probably will permit only known anti-Communist journalists to participate in the exchange program and give them strict	
operating guidelines.	25)
Libya: Retrenching in the Caribbean Since the US airstrikes on Libya last April, Tripoli—frustrated with the performance of its clients in the Caribbean and facing growing economic problems at	25>
home—has reduced its support for leftist activities in the Caribbean. Libya was upset over the lack of support forthcoming from the region immediately after the US attack and now considers the area a low priority. Other indications of a change in Libyan policy toward the Caribbean include:	25) 25)
• A Barbadian leftist's statement in May that there had been no progress toward the establishment of a Libyan-backed commercial bank in the region—to help fund leftist political activities—since the idea was first broached in Tripoli two months earlier	25>
• The indefinite postponement by the Caribbean Nation Movement (CNM)—a coalition of pro-Libyan leftist groups—of a June conference as a result of Libya's failure to provide the necessary funds, Tripoli also rebuffed CNM efforts to collect on previous Libyan pledges of support for some of the group's other activities in the region.	25 > 25 >
	25 X 1
Libya's new policy is probably the result of two factors. First, Tripoli may be temporarily withholding financial support from its Caribbean clients pending a show of violent anti-US action by these groups. Since the US attack, Libya has been placing increased emphasis on violent demonstrations and has stepped up its support of militant separatist groups in the French West Indies.	25X 25X

25X1

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1 25X1


Secret

We believe that Libya's Caribbean agenda will renext few months. Given current economic strings will curtail, and perhaps cease, funding the politic clients such as the CNM. Nevertheless, its target	encies, Tripoli almost certainly cal activities of its more moderate
lent anti-US activities apparently is continuing.	

25X1 25X1



Moscow's Gambit in Southern Afri Exploiting Apartheid	ica:	25 X 1
As the political situation in southern Africa grows more turbulent, the USSR is responding with a stepped-up propaganda and active measures program to manipulate African, Third World, and Western opinion, and to increase its ability to influence events there to its advantage. In our view, Moscow's penetration of UN organizations responsible for apartheid issues, its material and financial assistance to the major southern African liberation movements, and its continuing disinformation campaign linking Washing-	• In May 1985, an East German secretariat official chaired the Special Committee Against Apartheid's "International Conference on Women and Children Under Apartheid" in Tanzania; the Committee funded participation by four Soviet front groups—the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students, and the Soviet Women's Committee.	25X1
ton to Pretoria leave the Soviets well positioned to exploit widespread antiapartheid sentiment and to erode the political standing of the United States not only in Africa, but also throughout the world.	• In September 1985, the Special Committee Against Apartheid and the Hungarian Solidarity Committee—affiliated with the Soviet-controlled Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)—jointly sponsored a conference that attacked alleged	25 X 1
Exploiting the United Nations Moscow has had substantial success in using UN bodies in its efforts to keep the United States at a disadvantage on the apartheid issue. One of the major reasons for this success is the long-term Soviet effort to penetrate and co-opt UN elements responsible for dealing with southern African issues. the Soviets, their Bloc counterparts, and pro-Soviet sympathizers are able to exercise considerable influence over the UN Secretariat's Center Against Apartheid, the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, and the UN Council on Namibia.	US and Western support for apartheid. • Until protests early this year forced its removal, the WPC's monthly newsletter on apartheid, International Mobilization, carried a statement citing that the publication was produced by the "WPC in coordination with the UN Centre [sic] Against Apartheid." The Special Committee Against Apartheid has been a particularly successful Soviet influence operation.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
This influence has allowed Moscow to use the UN to spread anti-US disinformation, provide UN political and financial support to nongovernmental organizations hostile to the United States, and isolate the United States at major international conferences on		
 South Africa: At an April 1985 conference in Bulgaria, the Council on Namibia—heavily influenced by Soviet Bloc and front groups—charged US and Israeli support of South African nuclear weapons development. At 	Soviets were primarily responsible for the strong statement condemning certain West European governments and the United States at the Committee-sponsored International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, held in Paris in June.	25X1
another meeting this July in Vienna, the Council condemned alleged US collaboration with South Africa.		25X1





Antiapartheid propaganda of the International Union of Students, a Soviet front.

Secret 28

25X1

Marketing	Southern	African
Liberation	Movemen	ts

In addition to its successful manipulation of UN components, Moscow's ability to attack the United States on the apartheid issue is aided by extensive Soviet-Bloc support to the primary antiapartheid liberation movements in southern Africa. This year, for example, the Soviet, East German, and Bulgarian Communist Parties had representatives of the African National Congress (ANC) participate in their party congresses. Beyond such high-level visits, there is continuing and close collaboration between ANC representatives and the Soviets in marketing the political legitimacy of the ANC worldwide:

continuing and close collaboration between ANC representatives and the Soviets in marketing the political legitimacy of the ANC worldwide:						
•	Moscow has stationed liaison officers in ANC offices in Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola.					
•	the Soviets and their allies bankroll ANC participation in international conferences, including some sponsored by the United Nations.					
•	• ANC leaders work closely with Soviet front groups. Alfred Nzo, ANC Secretary General, is a Vice President of the WPC; and the WFDY sponsored an extended trip to the United States late last year for one of its ANC representatives.					
e tl p	Moscow's marketing of regional liberation movements xtends beyond the ANC. The Soviets also support he political agenda of the South-West Africa Peole's Organization (SWAPO) through, among other hings, conferences sponsored by their front apparatus					

and high-profile press coverage of SWAPO's leader-
ship. In addition, recent high-level Soviet overtures to
the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC/A) sug-
gest that Moscow is interested in establishing ties to
that group as well.

Moscow capitalizes on its close association with these movements in its propaganda activities. To reach the widest possible audience in southern Africa, Radio Moscow broadcasts regularly in English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Swahili, and Portugese—with frequent interviews and statements by senior ANC and SWAPO representatives. Within the region, Radio Freedom—the ANC station—and the Voice of Namibia—the SWAPO station—originate from Ethiopia. Soviet print media also give heavy attention to the apartheid issue, frequently featuring statements by such antiapartheid leaders as Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, and Winnie Mandela.

Dirty Tricks

Beyond these more or less overt activities, Moscow directs a substantial disinformation program to tie the United States to the South African regime. Our record of probable Soviet forgeries over the past few years indicates that several have surfaced for the purpose of "proving" the continuation of US—South African military cooperation after the cessation of US military support to South Africa in the late 1970s. The most recent of these—claiming that the administration had agreed to provide US troops to support South Africa—surfaced in Zimbabwe in June as a forged letter from a US Senator.

One of the most enduring of these disinformation campaigns alleging US-South African military cooperation concerns purported collaboration in creating an "ethnic" weapon. Evolving from Soviet charges in

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

29

1981 of South African testing of chemical and biological weapons, the allegation that Pretoria was developing a weapon that killed only blacks first surfaced in 1983 at an ad hoc UN committee hearing. The following year, it was published by the UN Special Committee on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Since that time, Israel and the United States have been accused of providing technical support. In the past year, it has resurfaced in at least five African countries—Botswana, Madagascar, Ghana, Mozambique, and Nigeria.

We believe that the Soviets are also behind allegations of US support to insurgencies directed against the governments of some Frontline States. In April, a Radio Mozambique broadcast charged the United States with supporting RENAMO, the rebel force opposing the Mozambican Government; the story was widely believed in Maputo because of US support of UNITA forces in Angola. Also in April the Zimbabwean Minister of Information alleged US support to

the South African-based station Radio Truth.

our view	apartne —have o mainta	made it	more d	ifficult 1	for the]	United	

widely held African view that the United States

25X 25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Outlook

We believe that the Soviet effort to capitalize on the apartheid issue will certainly continue and possibly intensify. Moscow has a solid base for propaganda operations in the United Nations, and its close association with southern African insurgent groups gives it impeccable credentials as a foe of apartheid. In addition, there are some indications of Soviet efforts to revitalize AAPSO as a vehicle for pushing Moscow's views on this issue before Third World audiences. For example, according to its executive plan for 1986, AAPSO plans to expand its antiapartheid activities, in part, by publicly calling for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. In terms of Moscow's disinformation program, African countries present a fairly soft target for these activities and we believe that, in addition to Zimbabwe, the Soviets have highly active operations in Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, and Tanzania as well. By reinforcing the

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War: A Model Propaganda Vehicle for the Future

25X1

The Soviet Union has successfully conducted a campaign to manipulate the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.

the Soviets have used numerous tactics to influence the group, including exploiting the leadership position of Soviet cochairman Yevgeniy Chazov, targeting the organization for covert action, and involving IPPNW in the activities of Moscow's traditional front group apparatus. As a result, the

leadership position of Soviet cochairman Yevgeniy Chazov, targeting the organization for covert action, and involving IPPNW in the activities of Moscow's traditional front group apparatus. As a result, the group has become increasingly critical of the United States. Encouraged by these developments, senior Soviet leaders are emphasizing the establishment of organizations similar to IPPNW in the future, but we believe Moscow may have some difficulty in duplicat-

Background

ing IPPNW's success.

While Moscow continues to mobilize its international front group apparatus and pro-Soviet Communist parties to promote Soviet initiatives and disparage US arms control policies, in recent years we have observed an increase in Soviet efforts to reach out beyond its traditional network of supporters. By exploiting disarmament sentiment in the West, Moscow's propagandists hope to create a broad-based opposition to US policies, particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), that will advantage it in arms control negotiations. Soviet success in promoting and influencing one such group—IPPNW 1—has convinced senior Soviet leaders that IPPNW is a model vehicle for generating widespread support for Soviet arms control policies:

¹ Responding to an invitation from American and Soviet doctors, a group of physicians from several nations—including the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States—met in 1981 to form the IPPNW as a public international forum to express hope for nuclear restraint. Since that time, it has grown into a large network of national affiliates that, according to a group spokesman, now together claim the support of some 150,000 physicians in 49 nations, with most of this membership coming from Bloc countries.

- Yuriy Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet Committee
 for the Defense of Peace, in a March article in the
 Soviet journal International Affairs, emphasized the
 significance of IPPNW as an example. He called on
 "major Soviet scientists, physicians, teachers, athletes and cultural figures to systematically work on
 problems of disarmament, prepare major proposals,
 and cooperate with their colleagues in the capitalist
 world in the struggle for peace."
- In a press conference on 14 July with representatives of the "International Scientists' Forum for the Cessation of Nuclear Tests," General Secretary Gorbachev mentioned IPPNW's development as an example for scientists opposed to nuclear testing.

Soviet Influence

The management structure of the IPPNW provides Moscow with ample opportunities for influence. The presidium—the most important organ—is composed of Soviet cochairman Yevgeniy Chazov and his American counterpart, Bernard Lown.

the day-to-day management is in the hands of an eight-member committee, including two doctors from the Communist Bloc.

Chazov has frequently used his leadership position to obtain the group's endorsement of Soviet arms control policies. For example, at the Sixth World Congress of IPPNW in Cologne this May, Chazov's longstanding public attacks on SDI were reflected in the final conference document, which urged other nuclear powers to join the Soviet nuclear test moratorium and refrain from the "militarization of space."

Moscow has also used its traditional front group apparatus in efforts to promote and influence IPPNW. The organization formerly shared office space in London with the Generals for Peace and 25**X**1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

Disarmament,² a Soviet front. In 1984 the World Peace Council (WPC) instructed its member organizations to ensure that their countries' physicians attended the IPPNW Congress held that year. membership lists of Soviet fronts—indicates that many IPPNW members belong to such fronts or take part in their activities. Indeed, an IPPNW delegation participated in a meeting last December in Copenhagen of the WPC-controlled Preparatory Committee for the "World Congress for the International Year of Peace," according to the attendance roster. the Soviets have in the past tried to influence IPPNW through more covert	world and to exploit IPPNW's prestige in Moscow's "peace offensive" in Western Europe. Soviet and East European members of IPPNW have played prominent roles in Soviet peace propaganda over the last several months. As part of a recently announced worldwide campaign highlighting the medical consequences of the nuclear arms race, an IPPNW delegation—after first stopping in Moscow following the group's Congress in May—made highly publicized visits to Japan and China. Increasingly Critical of the United States Over the years the IPPNW has become increasingly critical of the West in general and the United States	25X1 25X1 25X 25X 25X1
means as well.	specifically:	25X1 25X1
The Dutch Minister of the Interior declared to parliament that the BVD had proof of East Bloc attempts to influence the Congress with propaganda pamphlets. We suspect that such activities continue.	• The Third IPPNW Congress, held in June 1983 in Amsterdam, produced an appeal that reflected two longstanding Soviet propaganda lines, namely, that all nuclear powers must unequivocally agree to renounce the use of nuclear arms in any conflict, and that a freeze on nuclear weapons must be followed by their reduction and ultimate elimination from the arsenals of all countries.	25X1 25X1
While some national IPPNW affiliates are independent, others are controlled by local Communists. IPPNW affiliates in a number of Third World countries are dominated by Communists. Similarly, the French affiliate is directed by a core of Communist physicians and the Greek chapter is apparently closely tied to the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party, which supports the group through its front organization, the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace. But affiliates in several other West European countries—for example, Finland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom—have more broad-based memberships. Since the IPPNW was selected as the recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize, Soviet efforts to promote the organization have intensified. Soviet front organizations have taken	 After the Fifth Congress of the IPPNW held in Budapest in June 1985, US arms control policies received more criticism than those of the Soviet Union from speakers such as former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and West German Social Democratic Party leader Willy Brandt. At the Fifth Medical Congress for the Prevention of Nuclear War in Mainz, Germany, in November 1985, retired West German General Gard Bastian, a leading member of the Generals for Peace and Disarmament, spoke against Bonn's policies. In addition, the West German press reported that 2,000 of the participants held a demonstration in Wiesbaden to protest the number of NATO military installations in that region. 	25X1 25X1 25X1
² Generals for Peace and Disarmament is an affiliate of the Soviet-sponsored World Peace Council composed of former high-ranking NATO and Warsaw Pact officers.	A Qualified Propaganda Success Although IPPNW has been useful to Moscow in its international propaganda campaign on disarmament,	25X ⁻



IPPNW cochairman Chazov (left) and Lown receive the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo last December.



More recently, heavyhanded efforts by the group's leadership to focus discussion of the Chernobyl' accident exclusively on the incident's implications for nuclear war prompted some protest from the group's rank and file. At the group's World Congress in May, many West German physicians were dissatisfied with the refusal of IPPNW leaders to permit significant discussion of the dangers of civilian nuclear power. Der Spiegel reported that the group's cochairmen demurred, on the grounds that neither was an expert in that area, a position that found unanimous support on the IPPNW Executive Committee, which declared itself "for the discussion of nuclear war and nothing else."

In our view, however, Soviet handling of the criticism of Chazov's human rights record suggests that Moscow is well prepared to deal with such problems. In the months after the Nobel Prize award, other Soviet



General Secretary Gorbachev greets Chazov (far left) and Lown (middle left) in the Kremlin several days after the Nobel award ceremony.

physicians took the lead in representing Soviet Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War at peace conferences and in Soviet press interviews. When Chazov again assumed the spotlight at the May World Congress, he announced that Soviet dissident A. I. Shatravka, an activist in the independent Soviet peace organization "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and USA," would be released by the Soviet Government in response to an appeal by IPPNW.

More IPPNWs Ahead

We believe that the Gorbachev regime will push hard to establish other groups along the lines of IPPNW. Amid Soviet concern over the effectiveness of traditional front groups such as the WPC and growing public recognition of these groups' Soviet backing, the formation of joint Soviet-Western organizations of middle-class professionals offers Moscow an attractive alternative.

TASS reported in July that a group called the "Soviet-American Committee on International Architects, Designers, and Planners for the Prevention of Nuclear War" had been formed, with its copresident A. Polyanskiy proclaiming that the organization sought to "join the struggle in defense of peace."

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1 25X1

a contract of the contract of Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300420003-8 Secret

Transferring the IPPNW model to other arenas may not be as simple as it might seem to the Soviet leadership. Undoubtedly a large measure of IPPNW's current success is due to its ability to comment authoritatively on the medical consequences of nuclear war, Chazov's political position in the USSR and his leadership skills, and the fact that IPPNW was the first group of its kind. Most of these factors are unlikely to be replicated in future organizations. Indeed, Soviet success in manipulating IPPNW and its efforts to push the development of similar groups are vulnerable to public exposure.

25X1 25X1

	Calendar of Key Events, 1986-87	25X1
1986		
8-26 September	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference, Geneva. Because of the wide gap between the US and Soviet positions on the compliance issue, we believe that Moscow will try to gain maximum propaganda value by pointing to Gorbachev's proposal to ban chemical weapons, the interim agreement to prohibit CW transfer, and its touted flexibility on verification. The Soviets are likely to divert questions on compliance by arguing that BWC parties should await the outcome of ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons before tackling that issue.	25X1
16-22 September	11th World Trade Union Congress, Berlin. (See text for details.)	25X1
16 September– mid-December	UN General Assembly, New York. (See text for details.)	25 X 1
19-20 September	Shultz-Shevardnadze presummit meeting, Washington, D.C. This meeting will be an important factor in setting Moscow's propaganda direction for the anticipated next summit.	25X1
October	Conference on Central America, Rome. Initiated by the Sandinistas, this conference is being sponsored by the Italian Institute for African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern Studies (IPALMO), a leftist organization strongly influenced by the Italian Communist Party	25X1 25X1
11 October	West German peace movement demonstration against the stationing of US cruise missiles at Hesselbach. Although INF deployment is an issue of declining interest in West Germany, we expect the pro-Soviet German Communist Party to try to use this demonstration as a means of reviving the peace movement.	25 X 1
12 October	Municipal elections, Greece. the pro- Soviet Greek Communist Party (KKE) plans to exploit the governing Panhellenic Socialist Movement's (PASOK) call for political cooperation to gain PASOK support in districts where KKE electoral prospects are poor after the first round.	25X1
15-19 October	World Congress for the UN International Year of Peace, Copenhagen. (See text for details.)	25X1 25X1

20-23 October	10th Congress of International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), Sofia. This quadrennial meeting of the IOJ—a Soviet front—will likely push the "New International Information Order." The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization—another Soviet front—used this theme at an international conference last	0574
	April in Kabul.	25 X 1
24-31 October	UN Disarmament Week. The Soviets will use Disarmament Week—an annual celebration highlighting the UN's role in educating the public on disarmament issues—to promote their views on "Star Peace," a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and a binary chemical weapons ban. Various events will be scheduled for the week, many of them sponsored by Soviet front groups with Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) status in the United Nations. Military reporting suggests that the Soviets are trying to increase their influence over the Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs—who is in charge of Disarmament Week and the World Disarmament Campaign—by providing him with extravagant gifts.	25X1
3. 7	12d Consul Associate CW-1d Federation of Democratic Vend (WEDV)	
November	12th General Assembly of World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), Budapest. At this triennial meeting of the WFDY—a Soviet front—the organiza- tion will probably make SDI its major target. Last November, following a meeting of its Executive Committee in Berlin, the WFDY issued a worldwide appeal "for	
	the nonmilitarization of space."	25 X 1
4 November	CSCE Review Conference, Vienna. At the conference, we believe that the Soviets will continue to stress the theme of "mutual European concerns" and try to propagandize the view that the onus for successful negotiations is on the United States.	25 X 1
		20/(1
17-18 November	Herald Tribune's International Symposium on SDI, Paris. As part of its worldwide campaign against SDI, Moscow is certain to send at least one seasoned propagandist—such as Colonel-General Chervov of the Soviet General Staff— to attend the symposium. Past practice suggests that the Soviet participants will make themselves available to the Western media in an effort to press their views before as large an audience as possible.	25 X 1
		25/(1
24-26 November	International Conference on Central American Economic Integration, Managua. the Sandinistas are promoting this conference—a followup to the October Conference on Central America in	25 X 1
	Rome—in an effort to focus West European attention on Nicaragua's economic development problems.	25 X 1
1987		
25 January	Bundestag election, West Germany. We expect Moscow to task the pro-Soviet German Communist Party to try to influence the outcome of the election in favor of the Social Democratic Party—which has publicly stated its intentions to cancel the INF basing agreement if elected. Given the failure of heavyhanded Soviet influence tactics in the 1983 election, we believe Moscow will take a more subtle approach this year.	25X1
	approach this year.	20/1

36

February	Conference of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Auckland, New Zealand. According to a Japanese press report, this Soviet-manipulated group plans to discuss the nuclear threat in the Pacific region. Moscow probably will play up any antinuclear declarations from the meeting as more evidence of the need for a nuclear-free Pacific.	25 X 1
May	National election, Malta. As in past years, Libya probably will provide funds to the ruling Labor Party for the election, which, constitutionally, must be held by May 1987—but, which could take place at any time—in an attempt to ensure that it retains power. Already Qadhafi uses Malta as a base for disseminating propaganda to and carrying out terrorist activities in Western Europe. A Labor victory probably would expand the party's ties to Libya even further.	25X1 25X1
June	Ninth World Congress of Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), Moscow. This quadrennial meeting of the WIDF—a Soviet front group—will be used by the USSR to push Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 initiative to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000, In order to generate interest in the conference, especially among NGOs, the WIDF and its national affiliates reportedly have already begun sponsoring a series of regional meetings around the world.	25X1 25X1
	mootings around the world.	25 X 1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized	Copy Approved for Release	2012/02/29 : CIA-RDP87T00	0685R000300420003-8
Secret			
			•
	4.		
Secret			